Beyond Crisis
Re-evaluating Pakistan

Editor
Naveeda Khan
Introduction

Naveeda Khan

Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has faced numerous crises, from one-off catastrophic events, to the slow and steady intensification of debilitating conditions. The discourses through which crisis has been framed have been put securely in place through the exertions of disciplines such as political science, economics and more recently security studies.¹ These disciplines have traditionally been in close relationships to states by putting themselves in the service of states while serving to evaluate them. It is no different in Pakistan.² In fact, the three most obdurate evaluations of crises — the failure of the state, the failure of nationalism, and the external influence on the country compromising national sovereignty and security — were put in place quite early in Pakistan’s history. Moreover, these evaluations have greatly influenced subsequent intellectual inquiry and analysis in Pakistan.

The key question for us is: have these evaluations of crises adversely affected thinking about Pakistan? Certainly one could argue that they have to an extent closed off attention to those aspects of Pakistan that do not fall within the category of crisis and do not seem deserving of urgent reportage.³ Yet, I would argue somewhat differently. While these evaluations have certainly overshadowed more nuanced perspectives on Pakistan, they are yet perspicacious in capturing the affect of not getting it right. Furthermore, this affect, differentially expressed and embodied by a diverse range of Pakistanis, is a crucial aspect of belongingness in Pakistan. In other words, one comes to attach oneself to Pakistan, claim it as one’s own, through disclaiming it.

This argument will become clearer over the course of this introduction as I show how the evaluations appear with great regularity at different moments of crisis in Pakistan’s history expressing variations of the same affect. Furthermore, the essays in this volume help us to understand this mode of attaching to a modern nation-state, by showing how these evaluations carry ontological weight. In other words, through these essays we see how the failure of the state becomes a moment to ruminate on the artificiality of this most modern construct, the failure of nationalism, an opportunity to dream of alternative modes of association, and the failure of
sovereignty to consider the threats and possibilities of the realm of foreignness within the nation-state as within the self. Only then do we come to see that to belong to a nation-state is not always premised on a sense of sharing a common origin, language, ethnicity, territory or goal but may entail a shared sense of being alienated from it.

The ambition of this volume is not only to complicate standing representations of Pakistan. It is to take Pakistan out of the status of exceptionalism that its multiple crises have endowed upon it. By now many scholars have written of how exile, migrancy, refugeedom, and other modes of displacement constitute modern subjectivities (Cavell 1994; Agamben 1998; Said 2000). Through the argument I am making for Pakistanis’ mode of attaching to their nation-state, one inspired and sustained by the writings gathered here, I am saying that Pakistan is no stranger to this condition of human immigancy (Cavell 1989; Eldridge 2003). Therefore, it can be pressed into service in helping us to understand our present condition.

I begin with the crisis precipitated by the 1971 civil war between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan to show how the evaluations of crisis in scholarly discourse unfold along the lines I have already described. I choose this crisis as it is both a crisis event, that is, a war, and produced by crisis conditions that hold both before and after Pakistan’s subsequent break up into two nation-states, that is, the exacerbation of internal ethnic, linguistic and economic differences. The evaluations express, however mutedly, the sense that Pakistan is on the wrong course. Thereafter, I move forward in time to show how post-1971 evaluations of crisis return fixately to the problematic origins of Pakistan as if by way of explanation. Third, I move backwards to the earliest writings on Pakistan to show how these are also very pragmatic accounts of Pakistan’s shortcomings. I undertake this circuit of analysis so as to show just how integral the affect of not getting it right is to the fact of being of Pakistan. In the final section of this introduction I turn to the writings in this volume. By drawing out the theoretical and empirical work in them, I show how they transfigure the three evaluations of crisis with which we are working in this introduction. In so doing, they show crisis to index a more general, ontological condition of Pakistan, as of the world, but one that is also often exceeded.

The Problem of Belongingness
It was a rather unwieldy state that emerged in the aftermath of Partition, with its western and eastern wings physically separated by
of the realm of
Only then do we
ways premised
icity, territory
ed from it.
licate standing
ut of the status
ved upon it. By
refugeedom,
bjectivities
argument I am
ion-state, one
e, I am saying
an immigran
ted into service
ar between the
one evaluations
I have already
ent, that is, a
before and
states, that
and economically, the sense
ove forward in
ixedated to
ation. Third,
show how
ortcomings. I
g integral the
, In the
this volume.
them, I show
which we are
sis to index a
the world, but
aftermath of
separated by
a 1,000 miles of enemy territory. In 1971, the eastern wing formally
separated from Pakistan after a brutal civil war largely conducted
between the Pakistani army and Bengali guerilla forces on the territory
that was to become Bangladesh. I begin with this war because it was
the crisis par excellence to which one finds affixed the three evaluations
of Pakistan that I have mentioned previously; that of the failed state,
failed nationalism, and failed sovereignty. More importantly, as I
hope to show, the analysis of 1971 and the evaluations of Pakistan
that emerge from it not only inform subsequent scholarship but also
share much with earlier studies of Pakistan. This would suggest that
belongingness has always posed a problem for Pakistan.

First, a quick word about my sources. Leaving aside first-hand
accounts by Pakistan’s generals and bureaucrats (Niazi 1998; Salik
1978), empirical descriptions of the unfolding of events (Choudhury
1974; Zaheer 1994), and some creative writing in English, Urdu and
other regional literature (see Memon 1983), Pakistani analytic writings
on 1971 are sparse. As the idea of the foundational texts of 1971
has yet to take shape, I rely upon three well-known works on the war
offering us scholarly interpretations. While I have generally tried to
draw upon Pakistani scholars, I use Philip Oldenburg’s well-known
article on the war as it provides a clearer analysis of the failings of
Pakistan nationalism in 1971 than any other work I have encountered
(also see Ali 1970).

Rounaq Jahan’s Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (1971) went
to press at the same time that Bangladesh won its independence
from Pakistan. In this prescient analysis, Jahan, a political scientist,
captures the growing crisis of governance by which one government
after the other, for the most part located in West Pakistan, mismanaged
the politics and economy of East Pakistan. Such discriminatory
practices forced a consolidation of the demand for separation and
independence. You can hear the judgement of ‘failed state’ in the air
in her description of the common problems facing new states:

In the case of Pakistan, as we shall see, a disequilibrium arose in
the development of the country’s different sectors, i.e., in economic
development, modernization, state-building, and nation-building. The
failure to develop adequate nation-building polities, in spite of success
in other sectors, endangered the viability of the state (1971: 4).

Philip Oldenburg’s influential article “A Place Insufficiently
Imagined”: Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971’ (1985)
draws on Salman Rushdie’s words from his novel Shame (1997) to
describe Pakistan as a place insufficiently imagined. Oldenburg, a political scientist, captures something of the cultural difference between East and West Pakistanis in their different accounts of why they went to war. East Pakistanis went to war to make explicit their demand for parity between the east and the west and, failing that, to express their demand for separation and independence. In Oldenburg’s description, West Pakistanis responded to this demand as if it were a trace of the machinations of Hindus living in East Pakistan. They felt that by decimating Hindu influence on East Pakistan this demand would die out. Oldenburg’s article conveys less the failure of the state to undertake national integration and more the failure of West Pakistan to acknowledge a shared nationalism:

I shall show . . . that the exploitation of East Pakistan, the failure to build a nation encompassing the two peoples, and the tragic mistakes made in dealing with Bengali demands cannot be called inevitable unless one considers forces centered in West Pakistan which pushed the country apart. In this speculative view, the tragedy of Pakistan was in part the result of a failure of understanding by the ‘Pakistanis’, a failure to recognise what the meaning of Pakistan was for the Bengalis and a blind commitment by the ‘Pakistanis’ to their own model of the new state (1985: 712).

With Hasan Askari Rizvi’s early work Internal Strife and External Intervention: India’s Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) (1981), we have the classic evaluation of Pakistan’s sovereignty at risk due to undue external influence and outside intervention. Rizvi, a political scientist who now serves as a political and defence consultant of the region, shows that India was compelled to intervene on behalf of East Pakistan in its conflict with West Pakistan because of its shared linkages with East Pakistanis. These were, he recounts, ‘ideological linkages, linkages based on language and culture, and linkages between the Hindu community in East Pakistan and India’ (1981: 258). In other words, India and East Pakistan were clearly more sympathetically linked than East and West Pakistan. On the other hand, India’s motivations were also geopolitical: ‘It cannot be denied that there were humanitarian considerations underlying India’s intervention in the civil war in East Pakistan but we cannot ignore the fact that Indian intervention aimed at changing the political authority pattern of Pakistan’ (p. 260). India was encouraged in its ambitions by the implicit support of the Soviet Union, while Pakistan
Oldenburg, al difference accounts of maked explicit and, failing dependence. ed to this dus living in ence on East conveys less and more the alism:
the failure to c mistakes inevitable pushed kistan was tistanis, a e Bengalis ed of the

and External [Bangladesh] sovereignty intervention. and defence to intervene kistan because he recounts, culture, and on and India' were clearly kistan. On the : 'I cannot underlying : we cannot the political raged in its ile Pakistan clearly benefited militarily from US and Chinese support. Through his appraisal of the flow of sympathies, linkages, influences and military and other material support, Rizvi provides us a view of the region as one in which state sovereignty is not so much chimera as a negotiated ideal.

Thus we see how central the evaluations of the failed state, of nationalism and of sovereignty were to the analysis of the crisis of governance constituting the 1971 war and Bangladesh's subsequent secession from Pakistan. As mentioned previously (also see endnote 3), there is little sustained work on 1971 in Pakistan. While it does suggest a certain degree of willed ignorance on part of the state and its subjects, I find it intellectually untenable to say that Pakistan suffers from amnesia, as some Pakistani intellectuals now say in criticism of their nation-state. On the contrary, several essays in this volume show how 1971 produced marked effects on diverse domains of life in Pakistan. Moreover, there is one particular line of argument within scholarly discourse that would suggest an attempt to think through the aftermath of 1971. According to these views, Pakistan lost its meaning for existence as a homeland for South Asian Muslims after the losses it suffered in 1971, thus precipitating a stronger engagement with Islam (Weiss 1986). To put it less whimsically, the pragmatic approach the state of Pakistan had evolved to differences amongst Muslims prior to 1971 was replaced by a more ideological approach to Islam after 1971 (Cohen 2001). While I do not disagree that this break-up of Pakistan was followed by a more insistent turn to Islam, this argument denies the extended discussions over the place of Islam in a modern state and experimentation over Islamic modernity since the inception of Pakistan. By imputing amnesia to Pakistan, it imposes a psychological model, that of overcompensation, upon the state and society, letting commonsense substitute for empirically grounded analysis.

In lieu of the perspective that sees only amnesia at work in Pakistan's treatment of 1971 and that sees 1971 segue into a singular engagement with Islam, I posit that there is yet another way in which 1971 made its presence known in the post-1971 period. It is the intensity with which Pakistani scholars and historians took to examining Pakistan's beginnings. In other words, the intellectual soul-searching that 1971 generated in Pakistan did not actually attend to the events of 1971. Rather, it recursively extended to the origins of
Pakistan. The most famous writing of the post-war period would be that by the well-known Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal titled *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (1985). This book, much more so than any other writings attending to the origins of Pakistan (Ali 1983; Mufti 1995; Ahmed 1997), lays bare how the demand for Pakistan did not arrive on the crest of widespread popular support but on a patchwork of agreements and horse trading amongst Muslim elites in Muslim majority states in colonial India, notably Punjab and Bengal. Not only was there no consensus on what Pakistan was to be, nor was there any mandate for its creation. There was simply a single spokesman — Jinnah. Thus, in one fell swoop this analysis anticipates, but only after the fact, the earlier evaluations of failed state, nationalism and sovereignty, as if Pakistan could fare otherwise given the conditions of its emergence. Jalal’s parting words summarily delineate the impossible circumstances out of which Pakistan was born:

While Punjab writhed and turned under the impact of decisions taken in distant places, Mountbatten boldly claimed credit for having accomplished, in less than two and a half months, one of the ‘greatest administrative operations in history’. On behalf of the Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims who were slaughtered in their hundreds of thousands and the refugees who in their millions stumbled fearfully across the frontiers of the two states, the historian has a duty to challenge Mountbatten’s contention and ask whether this ‘great operation’ was not in fact an ignominious scuttle enabling the British to extricate themselves from the awkward responsibility of presiding over India’s communal madness (1985: 293).

Yet, one has only to look at the early literature of the 1960s on Pakistan by scholars such as K. B. Sayeed, K. K. Aziz or famously Hamza Alavi to find similar accounts of the problems of Pakistan at its origins. In his essay ‘Class and State’, the sociologist Hamza Alavi studies the oligarchic nature of the Pakistani state that must mediate vastly different interests and perspectives within its territorial rubric. At one point in the essay, Alavi calls the state ‘an alien force’ saying:

We can begin by recognizing a plain fact: that there is a widespread tendency on the part of regimes in peripheral capitalist societies, such as Pakistan, to acquire an authoritarian character and to proliferate military dictatorships (1983: 42).
In The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism (1967), the historian K. K. Aziz reminds us of the great many ideas of Pakistan that crowded the colonial scene:

Every nationalism is sui generis and takes on its character and shape from its context and environment. Each is a mixture of all these ingredients — but never in equal proportions. It is a compound of all these in varying dogma, another that of sentiment, still another that of policy. The same nationalism may appear sometimes to underline its doctrinal foundation and sometimes to over-accentuate its mythical content. However, it is unwise to underestimate or ignore the role of myths in nationalism (1967:15).

With this he launches into a critique of the mythical strains that constitute Pakistani nationalism so as to make tenuous the fact of its emergence.

As a final example, in The Political System of Pakistan (1967), K. B. Sayeed, the political scientist who intermittently served in the government, explored how Pakistan’s inheritance of the colonial structure influenced its experimentation with various political systems. Writing about Ayub Khan’s experimentation with Basic Democracies, at one point he says:

Ayub’s approach to Pakistan’s politics in similar to that of the British regime in India. The British felt that the demand for representative politics and political independence was largely confined to urban groups, particularly the city lawyers, and therefore, if they were kept in check, it would be relatively easy to control the rural areas (1967: 213).

The wording of these analyses are much different from later evaluation. In speaking of an oligarchic state, Alavi is not yet speaking of a state bound to failure; in speaking of competing nationalisms, Aziz is not declaring nationalism a failed project; and in speaking of the continuation of the colonial structure into the present, Sayeed is not decrying the impossibility of sovereignty. Rather, they speak pragmatically in the expressed hope that Pakistan may yet overcome its problems. However, this literature review from 1971 forward and then backward in time is useful as it shows how there has always been a strain within Pakistani studies concerned with its tenuous origins, systemic weaknesses and possible/eventual failures in the field of
statecraft, nationalism and sovereignty to which crises have served as instances for expressing these anxieties.

At one level, my analysis would seem to signal the problem of belongingness: how faultlines such as I have been outlining perpetually undercut belongingness to Pakistan. Yet the persistence with which these faultlines are visited and revisited suggest that something else may be afoot. I would venture to say that it is not that belongingness is a problem in Pakistan but rather that belongingness is premised upon acknowledging and mulling over the problems of Pakistan. I am not in any way suggesting that Pakistan does not have serious issues with which it has to contend, but nonetheless reading these evaluations of crisis against the grain is productive. It allows one to understand the consistency of certain discursive preoccupations of the state of Pakistan and its subjects, intellectuals and laymen alike, and thereby to excavate a more complex means by which attachment to Pakistan happens.

**Crisis and Ontology**

How are we to understand the specific relationship between crisis and the ontological condition of human immiigrancy I am imputing to Pakistan? It is not the case that life in Pakistan is in a state of perpetual crisis. To say so would deprive crisis of its definitional import as a critical turning point within a given event or condition. It would also cast life in Pakistan in a somewhat unreal light to think of it as always crisis-ridden. Rather, crisis in Pakistan has served as the occasion to articulate evaluations that express something about Pakistan, in particular the modes of attaching to it. Moreover, the way in which the essays and excerpts in this volume treat these evaluations, we see how they come to carry ontological weight. In other words, reflections upon a specific set of crisis events and evaluations express something more generally about the present. In so doing, the writings render the evaluation of Pakistan as a failed state into a meditation on the artificiality of the modern state, that of the failure of nationalism as a difficulty of committing to one vision of things, and the failure of sovereignty as an anxiety over the foreignness that resides within. Yet, no sooner as they do as much, they rearrange established historical facts, relocate themselves elsewhere than the point of view of the state, bring into view new vistas of innovation and forces of contingency, and provide alternative ways of being. In particular, they draw our attention to that which exceeds crisis. And more often than not this excess accrues from the dimension of the everyday that runs
risks have served

tinal the problem
be outlining
that the persistence
ated suggest that
not that
at belongingness
the problems of
an does not have
etless reading
ive. It allows one
reoccupations of
and laymen alike,
ich attachment

between crisis
am imputing to
ate of perpetu
al import as a
n. It would also
k of it as always
the occasion
out Pakistan, in
way in which
ations, we see
rds, reflections
ress something
ings render the
the artificiality of
of committing to
over the foreignness
hey rearrange
there than the
of innovation
of being. In
and more often
yday that runs
through any event or condition and that cannot be delimited to crisis
alone. In other words, the writings gathered here simultaneously
inhabit crisis and the horizon beyond it.

In the interest of drawing out the fullest scope of the work under-
taken by these writings, I arrange my discussion of them according
to the following themes: (i) the artificiality of the state, (ii) nationalist
visions, (iii) the foreignness within, and (iv) the everyday. I put these
themes into conversation with broader theoretical perspectives on
the state, nationalism, sovereignty and the everyday. I should say at
the outset that each of these writings could be taken to speak to several
of these themes, and to speak to others besides, but I have chosen to
group them so as to draw out our themes more forcefully.

Artificiality of the State

Timothy Mitchell’s now classic essay “The Limits of the State: Beyond
Statist Approaches and their Critics” (1991) put forward some of the
crucial Foucauldian lineaments of the study of the state that endure
to the present. Most notably, Mitchell gave us the state that does
not have presence as such but which is retrospectively produced by
a dispersed field of bureaucratic and administrative effects. In Magic
of the State (1996) Michael Taussig gave a different understanding in
which the state substantiates itself through its entanglement with
local practices of magic, sorcery and secrecy. In their introduction to
Anthropology at the Margins of the State (2004) Veena Das and Debbie Poole
proffer a useful conjoining of the two perspectives by emphasising
that the state partakes of both logics, that of transparent government
and hidden practices by appearing both legible and illegible to its
constituencies.11 Legibility and illegibility are mutually constitutive
and are present together in the everyday life of the state.

The varied experiences of the state in Pakistan provide a specific
take on the issue of the legibility and illegibility of states. While
the state is pervasive in everyday life, actualised and naturalised
through material artifacts such as decrees and documents, the state
is also experienced as artificial, in so far as it does not fit individual
circumstances. It appears differentially remote and indifferent. While
this perception of the state would raise the crucial question of whether
it indicates an opting out of Pakistan, in line with the analysis that I
have been putting forth in this introductory essay, I would ask that
we consider this discomfort with the state not as seeking separation
from it but assimilation within it, to borrow Aamir R. Mufti’s felicitous
words (2007). These experiences of the state are useful because they show how statecraft is a fine management of senses of artificiality and naturalness, how quickly a state can flip from one sense of it to another or how both senses of the state may persist alongside each other.

It is with Aamir R. Mufti's contribution to this volume that I begin my discussion of those essays that bring to mind ruminations on the artificiality of the state. Mufti's essay, 'A Lyric History of India', speaks of the Urdu progressive poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz who hailed from Sialkot and resided in Lahore, Punjab. Lahore was granted to Pakistan during partition. That was how Faiz came to be in Pakistan after 1947. Thus, by the sleight of hand of states, Mufti claims, Faiz found himself an exile in his own hometown from his beloved India. Faiz gave most poignant expression to the artifice and artificiality of states by setting himself up in the role of an outsider to the state in which he found himself marooned. At one point he left for Beirut, Lebanon in self-imposed exile. This movement outwards was not to mark his distance from Pakistan but to move to a desired picture of it, for he used his position of exile to launch the most stringent criticisms of Pakistan's various military governments.

The central crisis in Faiz's life was his irreparable separation from himself, that is, from that version of himself that persisted in un-divided India. Mufti finds Faiz to give fullest expression to his sense of separation from himself in what Mufti describes as 'lyric poetry'. This poetry, specifically (i) the ghazal and (ii) the nazm forms, has been largely ignored for being decadent, claimed as masochistic by Faiz's leftist compatriots in Pakistan for self-indulgently mourning the loss of a beloved without any explicit political objectives. Yet, deep within Faiz's lyric poetry Mufti finds that the lost beloved was none other than the Indian subject, a collective selfhood. The self as Indian that resists reification as a stable singularity nicely illustrates the theme of foreignness residing within, a theme further developed in the essay by Deepak Mehta in this collection, through the introduction of the very possibility of the Hindu within the self. It also expresses a critique of the nationalist project in that it asks to what extent a common vision of a future can be forged when the past, with the figure of the Indian/Hindu as the trace of a time of commingling and conflict, of separation and union, remains repressed. Thus, partition serves as a foundational event in Mufti's account, from which point issue out
useful because their senses of artificiality in one sense of it to sist alongside each volume that I begin and ruminations on ‘A History of India’, Faiz who hailed ore was granted to e to be in Pakistan Mufti claims, Faiz his beloved India, and artificiality of ider to the state in he left for Beirut, outwards was not a desired picture he most stringent nts.

e separation from t persisted in un-

sion to his sense s as ‘lyric poetry’. m forms, has been sochistic by Faiz’s nourning the loss . Yet, deep within d was none other self as Indian that strates the theme oped in the essay production of the presses a critique xtent a common the figure of the and conflict, of ritation serves as point issue out

trajectories of the sense of the state as artificial, the repression of memories and unfulfilled nationalist aspirations.

In ‘The Politics of Commensuration: The Violence of Partition and the Making of the Pakistani State’, Tahir Hasnain Naqvi also treats partition as a foundational event in the history of Pakistan. However, he speaks of it as such from the perspective of the state which, he says, staked its sovereignty upon the management of refugees pouring into Pakistan in the aftermath of partition. As the movement of people reached momentous proportions with the outbreak of unanticipated violence between the two opposing streams of refugees, Pakistan state worked furiously to cast wide its net so as to appear to have anticipated the violence and thus to have planned for all exigencies.

In so doing, Naqvi says, the state revealed its paradoxical self-positioning. Unlike the worldwide refugee situation at the time when the European state, for instance, staked its sovereignty on its ability to produce and dispose of ‘bare life’ such as that of refugees (Agamben 1998), Pakistan staked its sovereignty on the appropriate reception and integration of refugees, that is, on the fullest flowering of their lives. In so doing it also had to subsume within itself the violence for which the refugees, that is, its future citizens, were responsible. Thus, it ended up staking its sovereignty upon violence. However, in not being able to countenance violence, in other words, in not being able to admit that the violence exceeded its governmental plans and projections, it both gave expression to its act of self-construction and to the limits of its constructed nature. In a sense then the refugees became the marker of this paradoxical self-positioning, both an integral part of the state’s construction of itself and outside of it. Shahmim Raza, a refugee quoted in Naqvi’s paper, eloquently gives expression to this paradox. Thankful to have reached Pakistan, she expresses her gratitude to Pakistan for giving her refuge. But in the same breath she speaks of having returned to her homeland and awaits her full rights as its citizen. The refugee would seem to refract the artificiality of the state, both legitimising the state while serving as the foreign within.

Oskar Verkaik’s contribution, ‘A Real Terrorist’, an excerpt from his book Sayyid Pakistani and the Wedding of the Dead, continues the saga of the refugees from India, self-designatedly the muhajirs, into the recent past in Pakistan. Uneasily integrated into major urban centres in Sind, notably Hyderabad and Karachi, the muhajirs had by now a violent history of confrontation with both the provincial and
federal government, arising out of their sense of the state’s failure to follow through on its promises to this constituency. It was a most peculiar constituency; without any autochthonous claim upon Pakistan but which constituted the bulk of the political movement for Pakistan and upon whose linguistic and cultural provisions Pakistan relied, as evidenced by Pakistani films of the 1960s about which Ifthikhar Dadi writes in this collection. In this particular essay Verkaaik explores how young men born in Pakistan feel the state to be remote and indifferent to their lot, yet simultaneously feel themselves to be intimately connected to it in so far as their violent actions impinge directly upon its body politic. In so doing, he provides the perspective of the *muhajirs* on the paradoxical relationship between themselves and the state of Pakistan, as previously outlined by Naqvi, some 40 years since Partition in which their violence founds the state but stands outside of it.

Verkaaik conveys a variegated sense of this distant yet intimate connection to the state through the stories of two young men, friends, both of whom are recruited by the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement), the major political force that emerged in the 1980s to represent the interests of the *muhajirs*. While Adil feels strongly the force of political rhetoric and is quickly persuaded to undertake a difficult, possibly violent mission, Javed experiences the rhetoric as hollow and the invitation to action as the sly overtures of a political machine that willingly sacrifices its young for its own perpetuation. Risking the derision of his friends, he chooses instead to marry, desire his wife and find a job. Verkaaik’s lyrical description of *muhajir* dominated Hyderabad and of the boys’ lives therein strongly introduces the singular dimension of the everyday with its own siren calls that cut through the entanglement of lives with the state.

Yet, by the 1980s, it was not the provincial and ethnic dissonance of which Naqvi and Verkaaik speak that informed one’s sense of alienation from Pakistan. It was the sectarian divides that emerged most forcefully under President Zia ul-Haq. Most notably, sectarianism felt as though produced by the state’s policies and practices underlining public perception of the state as an alien force (Zaman 2007). Through his close analysis of the text The Magnificent Power Potential of Pakistan written by Shakyh Wahid Baksh Sial Rabbani, Rob Rozenhnaal shows how a prominent *shakyh* (leader) of the Pakistani branch of the Sufi *silsila* (lineage), the Sabri Chistiya, attempted to
of the state's failure and remoteness. It was a most
claim upon Pakistan's own view, as which Iftikhar Dadi
y Verkaaik explores the perspective between themselves
sowed by Naqvi, some of the state but
establish the spiritual prefiguring of Pakistan to castigate the state
for wasting Pakistan's heritage.¹²
In 'Re-imagining the "Land of the Pure": A Sufi Master Reclaims
Islamic Orthodoxy and Pakistani Identity' Rozehnal shows Wahid
Bakhsh writing that, irrespective of who and what actually brought
Pakistan into being, it was already augured by Sufi saints of the region.
In other words, it was to come into being, irrespective of human
agency. Pre-figured in a spiritual vision, it was to be the world's first
spiritedly grounded nation-state powered as much by spirituality as
by its other material and military resources. So even though Sufis and
Sufism had fared poorly in Pakistan, due as much to administrative
interference into their material affairs as to a widespread suspicion
of them inculcated by modernist Islam, it was Sufism that grounded
the creation of Pakistan. It was Sufism that would allow it to over-
come the violence of its origins, the perceived artificiality of its state,
and the dispersal of its nationalist project into contending sectarian
and political visions to produce unity towards ensuring its worldly
success. Albeit based in love for humanity, this was Sufism with a
fighting spirit in that it would fight for Pakistan in the face of endur-
ing polytheism, modern paganism and western materialism, a Sufism
clearly cognisant of the threats of the foreignness both within and
without. What Shakyh Wahid Bakhsh calls 'the power potential of
Pakistan', Mazher Sahib, the self-styled pir (spiritual guide) in Verkaaik's
piece, calls 'super potential'.

**Difficulties of Committing to a Single Vision and Foreignness Within**

While older studies of nationalism made a virtue of the substantive
sharing of common origins, languages, ethnicities, etc., in his now
classic statement *Imagined Community* (1991), Benedict Anderson
shifted our focus from the substance of what is shared to the modular
modes of sharing itself, particularly, the selective memorialisation
and collective forgetting practised by a buoyant nationalism and
ergent nation-state. Yet, what if that which is shared is exactly
the inability to memorialise and collectively forget, the winnowing
through competing claims to an agreed upon version of the useful
past and a possible future?

The early subaltern historians (Guha and Spivak 1988) responded
to this challenge with detailed studies of divergent tendencies
within Indian nationalism under British colonial rule, showing how
consensus was often no more than a momentary agreement that dispersed into acts of coercion and what has famously been called 'dominance without hegemony' (Guha 1998). More often than not, however, they were qualifying a nationalism whose success, in so far as it produced freedom from colonialism, they took for granted. Furthermore, they delimited difference in their accounts as they tended to pit subaltern groups as relatively homogenous against a highly individualised and internally differentiated nationalist elite. What if we were to take account not only of the differences that run internal to any community but within any imaginary or even within the individual? Would it render uncertain the success of nationalism? What would it do to the assumed sovereignty of the self as of the state?

In *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution* (1994), James Siegel recounts a famous scene in the writings of an Indonesian nationalist in which he realises that a Dutch policeman has mistaken him, however fleetingly, for a Dutch colonial. In that moment of misrecognition the author realises in a flash that he could pass for someone else, not necessarily Dutch but not necessarily a Javanese-speaking person linguistically and culturally tied to a specific locality. It is this other thing for which he could pass, the foreignness within him that the Dutch policeman’s mistake inadvertently captures, which constitutes an emergent Indonesian identity. In other words, it is precisely difference internal to a self, a self that is hidden to itself, militating against any notion of the sovereignty of the self which opens up the possibility of nationalism. Transposing this picture of the self upon the sovereignty of a state unsettles the assumption of a state known to itself and its citizens.

Once again, the experiences in Pakistan can contribute both specifically and generally to a discussion of divergent tendencies within nationalism and foreignness within oneself. As mentioned previously, nationalism has been declared a failed enterprise in Pakistan, as much a failure of citizens to fully subscribe to a single vision, as of the state in successfully naturalising such a vision. Yet if one looks at Pakistan’s relation to Islam, which is usually taken to be singular, multiple imaginations of this relatedness abound, from recasting Pakistan’s troublesome origin as one of fulfilling a Sufi vision (see Rozehnal) to considering Pakistan the guardian house of an archaic Islam (see Abbas). These arguments would suggest the flowering of imagination
ry agreement that has often been called for success, in so accounts as they belong against an nationalist elite. Differences that run deep or even within the self as of the self.

Siegell recounts a nationalist in which it is recognized for someone else, the speaking person. It is this other within him that the which constitutes itself, it is precisely itself, militating him opens up the self upon n of a state known, n. The essay explores the tensions within the tension mentioned previously, Pakistan, as much as the state looks at Pakistan's singular, multiple casting Pakistan's on (see Rozehnal) and initial Islam (see the problem of imagination)

in the absence of an official nationalism. While the threats of an excess of imagination have been amply explored, the possibilities remain as yet understudied perhaps because of their challenge to an always emergent official nationalism. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that an official nationalism has not been effective. In the ways in which certain imaginations of solidarity and possibilities for relatedness, such as those based on class consciousness (see Dadi and Ali), have been rendered as though non-existent in the history of Pakistan would suggest how influential even the most unsuccessful form of officialdom has been.

An exploration of foreignness further suggests just how complicated a task it is to forge a nationalism premised on sameness or to assume sovereignty as self-contained. While foreignness has most often been studied as the extent of external influence and intervention in Pakistan, it must also be of consideration in the ways in which a particular colonial past continues to be present even in one's ways of speaking and living. Furthermore, foreignness may reside in the ways in which shared pasts are repressed within one's memories, repugnant others are rendered intimate within the recesses of one's self, and selves turn against themselves. As such it may be considered an elsewhere lining one's interior, perhaps, even a productive outside located within oneself from which to look upon oneself and one's milieu.

Thus, while Mufti, Naqvi, Verkaai and Rozehnal give us essays that explore how the state appears to its citizens, the essays by Dadi, Saikia and Ali more explicitly address the interrelations and tensions among different bodies of the citizenry suggesting the difficulties, if not the impossibilities, of sustaining a nationalist vision. Iqtidar's essay is a close study of the interrelations between two political parties that suggest not so much limits of nationalism as how one's bitterest rival, in clear opposition to everything one stands for, can serve to educate one.

In 'Registering Crisis: Ethnicity in Pakistani Cinema of the 1960s and 70s', Itikhar Dadi makes Pakistani Urdu films, lush melodramas of the 1960s and 1970s, the subject of his essay. He finds in them a growing anxiety that nothing concrete holds Pakistan together. And this anxiety is articulated cinematographically through the failure of Urdu to establish its linguistic and cultural hegemony. This hegemony was, after all, the promise that the muhajirs once held for the state of
Pakistan and upon which the Urdu-speaking non-mukhajir Pakistanis, notably the Punjabis, count to pull Pakistan together. Dadi explores the sense of crisis from within the nationalist project to establish Urdu as the lingua franca of the nation-state through the changing self-representation of the Urdu-speaking person in Pakistani cinema.

In the movie Arman (Desire), made in the mid-1960s in the heyday of Ayub Khan's modernist military leadership, the Urdu-speaking elite are presented as free of the trappings of tradition and joyfully immersed in an American-style modernity. However, by the time the movie Anari (Novice) was made in the mid-1970s, the representation of the Urdu-speaking person had undergone a major transformation from being cosmopolitan to appearing provincial. So although the Urdu-speaking village buffoon, the protagonist of the film, prevailed, his representation as close to caricature revealed deep ambivalence over his success. Thus, says Dadi, Urdu cinema ceased to be; moving into television serials to be replaced by the popular regional films, of which Punjabi films have been particularly successful.

In 'Listening to the Enemy: The Pakistani Army, Violence and Memories of 1971', Yasmin Saikia presents a small portion of her long-term study of the after-effects of the war between West and East Pakistan in 1971 of which I spoke in an earlier section. What is noteworthy about Saikia's study is that she brings India into the picture such that we see this war as a complex three-way struggle as opposed to a unilateral offense by West Pakistan. Within this context, Saikia attempts to redress the excess of speech over the war on the part of nationalist Bangladesh and triumphal India, and the continued silence on the part of the aggressor, Pakistan, by speaking of the collective suffering the war has entailed and its possible overcoming through the philosophy of insaniyat (humanity). Thus, she attends as carefully to the narratives of events of war by military generals and their subalterns as those of the numerous victims of war in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.

She most vividly recounts the narratives of encounter between West and East Pakistanis when the generals and subalterns of the predominantly West Pakistani army are sent to East Pakistan in preparation for war. The culture shock is palpable in the West Pakistani soldiers' accounts of finding themselves air-dropped into rural East Pakistan where the dense vegetation, the watery landscape and the Bengali-speaking people feel alien. The raping, the killing and the scavenging for food all run into one another as just so many
tasks within a day's work in the army. The shock of encounter is very illuminating of the fact that the West and East were strangers to one another despite being of one nation-state, putatively united under one religion.

Thus, Dadi gives us the cinematic scene of encounter between the Urdu-speaking elite of Pakistan and Punjabis, and Saikia the military encounter to death between West and East Pakistanis, both showing in their distinct ways the difficulties besetting the nationalist project in Pakistan. With Kamran Ali's essay 'Strength of the State Meets Strength of the Street: The 1972 Labour Struggle in Karachi', we are offered an account of a different kind of project which tried to rise above regional and ethnic divides, even above nationalism, to engender class consciousness. He writes of the workers' struggle of the 1960s culminating in the 1972 Labour Struggle in Karachi. Within Ali's careful account, we learn that workers experienced Ayub Khan's military regime quite differently than the Urdu-speaking elite mentioned in Dadi's paper. The regime did not come with buoyant promises of modernity, as with heavy repression and governmental procedures shortchanging international labour standards. However, what comes across in Ali's account is how worker politics continued to be quite lively with popular strikes and encirclements. Also clear is the varied and paternalistic nature of the trade union movement that tried to graft itself on to worker politics. While Ali is careful not to overplay the ethnic divides, it is clear that workers were as marked and placed within hierarchies by ethnicity as by class positions.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's ascension to the Presidency of Pakistan following the 1971 war brought promise of a new era of labour politics. However, when a worker strike in June 1972 was met by an unprecedented intensity of police violence it became clear that the Pakistan People's Party government lead by Bhutto was not that different from Ayub's military government. While Ali leaves us with a sense of the dissolution of the worker struggle into weakened trade unions and a slide into patron-client relations with the state, we are nonetheless given to learn that such a place with a heavy interpenetration of bureaucracy, industry and military could and did once give birth to vibrant worker politics.

Following Ali's lead in describing a once vibrant leftist movement in Pakistan, Humeira Iqtidar's essay 'Learning to be Left: Jamaat-e Islami (II) in Pakistan', shows just how influential the left labour movement once was by exploring how the religious party, Jamaat-e
Islami, I belligerently anti-left and anti-communist since the 1980s, learnt from it. While it has been generally assumed that the JI is an elitist party, subscribing to a vanguard theory of political leadership (Nasr 1994), Iqtidar shows how JI incorporated techniques of grass-roots mobilisation utilised by the left through participation in leftist political rallies of the 1960s and early 1970s.

In the 1990s the Pakistan Army attempted to force a new style of contract upon the country's peasants. At this time the peasants turned to none other than JI's Kisan Board (Farmers Board) to solicit its help in negotiating with the army. This suggested its success in winning over workers and peasants. Moreover, the choice of JI over any other groups is interesting in that it is made by Christian peasants, leading one to ask whether a political party with an explicitly Islamic agenda has for its Christian constituency. It suggests, as Iqtidar nicely brings out, that the JI did not simply learn organisational tricks from the left but that they may have learnt to be left-leaning.

With the essays by Ahmed, Abbas, Mehta and Hyder, we move to a consideration of the theme of foreignness. Foreignness within Pakistan has most often been spoken of as the undue external influence and intervention into its inner workings, by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya or any other nation. Pakistan's porous nature often makes suspect the intentions and workings of its state, political parties and civil institutions to the average person (Verkaaik 2001). Yet foreignness may also be thought of as the persistence of colonial structures of government into the present as has been well explored by many Pakistani scholars (Sayeed 1967; Jalal 1990). The essay by Asad Ahmed, 'From Muslims to Apostates: The Legal Construction of Muslim Identity and Ahmadi Difference', goes further in examining the extent to which colonial categories and procedures continue to inform civil and criminal law, which are said to have been reformed by bringing them into alignment with the tenets of Islam.

Through close readings of parliamentary debates on constitution making and amending in the 1970s, cases in the high courts and the parallel structure of sharia (Islamic Law) courts in the 1980s, culminating in a Supreme Court decision in the early 1990s, Ahmed shows how the state uses syncretic modes of legal reasoning and a wide range of legal instruments to secure its position as the ultimate authority on Islam. In his exploration of how the state struggles to render Ahmadis, the newest entrants to the Islamic community, into non-Muslims through laws and courts largely given to it by
an early 1990s, Ahmed's reasoning and analysis of the ultimate state struggles to form a viable nation, given to it by the colonial state, he shows how colonialism continues to animate contemporary struggles over Islam.

A persistent aspect of foreignness that has come up several times already in our discussion is that of the Hindu within the Pakistani body politic and self. Earlier, I discussed Oldenburg describing how West Pakistanis were convinced of Hindu influence in East Pakistan, leading them to think that if they were able to eradicat this influence East Pakistanis would fall in line. We discussed Mufti’s subtle exposition of Faiz pining for his collective self, that is, his self as Indian/Hindu. Then we had Wahid Bakhsh decry the lingering influence of polytheism in Islam in Pakistan in Rozehnal’s essay. Thus, we see how the Hindu moves from being a physical presence within a body politic, to being a part of the inner self, to being a metaphysical scourge upon monotheism. These examples also point to the efforts by Pakistanis to continue to grapple with the place of India in their memories, imagination and anticipations. Thus, the figure of the Hindu and of India more generally constitutes a dense symbolic system within the Muslim imaginary in Pakistan, one that is yet to be properly unpacked.

Deepak Mehta’s contribution to this collection, ‘Words that Wound: Archiving Hate in the Making of Hindu-Indian and Muslim-Pakistani Publics in Bombay’, goes some way in undertaking the unpacking for us. In an examination of the colonial archives in Bombay of the 1920s, Mehta finds a fine equilibration of insults and counter-insults that sustains the structure of hate between Bombay’s Muslim and Hindu communities in the present. The archives suggest two communities who once lived cheek by jowl with intimate knowledge on how to hurt each other, a deep familiarity with one’s enemy being necessary for putting everyday life under jeopardy and ensuring it. But what makes Mehta’s essay most relevant for our volume on twentieth-century Pakistan is the extent to which Pakistan constitutes the foreign within India. There is a standing imagination of Pakistan that draws upon the colonial archives of hate, as Mehta provocatively calls them, and a vigilance of Muslim communities by Hindu nationalist groups to see that they do not try to act Pakistani or grow a Pakistan within present day India. In other words, the idea of Pakistan does not belong to Pakistan alone. While also serving as a subtle referent in the speech of Indian Muslims, Pakistan and Pakistani circulate among and acquire elements of the fantastic in the political speech of extremist Hindu groups in India.
The theme of foreignness as mediated by colonialism gets a different twist in Sadia Abbas’s essay, ‘Itineraries of Conversion: Judaic Paths to a Muslim Pakistan’. She writes of how Imran Khan, the reputed Pakistani ex-cricketer, ex-playboy and budding politician, chooses a route of return to Islam sharply distinguished from the Islam inherited by Pakistan from its colonial and pre-colonial predecessor states, the Islam of which Wahid Bakhsh once complained as being dispersed into numerous and conflicting sectarian visions (see Rozehnal). He selects as his sources of inspiration two Jewish converts to Islam, Muhammad Asad and Maryam Jameelah, who claim access to an archaic form of Islam in which they see the perfect expression of Universal Judaism against the narrow strictures of Zionist Judaism.

Abbas claims that in the process of converting out of the Islam, into which Khan is presumably born as a Pathan in Pakistan, into this archaic vision of Islam, Imran Khan uncritically reproduces the orientalist tropes utilised by Jameelah and Asad in speaking of Islam as an unchanging constant and Muslims as bearing the permanent inscription of Islam upon them. Moreover, the fact that Imran Khan marries a Jewish girl from England and converts her to Islam, hints Abbas, indicates there may be a fantasy at work of conquering and subsuming Jewry within Islam. We are made to see how there is something very singular and perhaps unassimilable about this particular vision of Islam, unlike that of Shakh Wahid Bakhsh’s that aims to reunite all Pakistanis under the rubric of Sufism. At the same time, Abbas raises for us the marvellous question of what is it about Pakistan that gives occasion for such fantasies.

By speaking of Muhammad Iqbal, the Indian poet–philosopher posthumously declared Pakistan’s poet laureate, Akbar Hyder’s contribution, ‘Iqbal and Karbala’, brings to the fore the one historical persona who expresses all the ambivalences preoccupying Pakistanis, which I have been elaborating. Muhammad Iqbal is said to be the visionary of Pakistan. Yet, in all his writings he militates against the form of the modern state, seeing it as too artificial to capture the organic nature of the ʿummah (community of believers). He is upheld as the exponent of a certain variant of Indian nationalism. However, in his later life, he is said to have thought coexistence impossible with religious others. Further yet, his writings continually speak of the foreign within through the figuration of Hinduism as the Brahmin or the temple.
In this essay, Hyder introduces another paradox into Iqbal's persona. Iqbal is said to have been disapproving of Sufism, considering it a form of flight from the world. Hyder unveils him to be a sensitive Sufi in the Sunni tradition for whom Karbala, the symbol of oppression of the Shias, served as the trope of martyrdom for all Muslims, regardless of sectarian affiliation. Most astonishingly, Hyder claims, Iqbal rendered the two polar opposites within the Karbala drama, the martyred Husain and the oppressive Yazid who ordered his killing, as a dialectical unity. This dialectic, presumably lying within Muslims, further complicates any picture of a sovereign state or a self.

The Everyday

While anthropology is the discipline most often preoccupied with everyday life, it is unfortunate that the two contemporary theorists who have exerted great influence on the concept of everyday life have not sufficiently attended to the dimension of the everyday in and of itself. In other words, they have tended most often to see it as derivative of a standing political and economic order. While Henri Lefebvre in The Production of Space (1991) considers everyday life to be the passive site where structural inequalities play themselves out, in The Practice of Everyday Life (1984) Michel de Certeau asserts the agential nature of everyday life by showing how people resist and undermine structures of dominance from within. Yet neither considers how everyday life may have its own inner dynamics and temporalities in which structural forces have their place.

If scholarly attention to Pakistan has by and large been preoccupied with the state and nation, it is only very recently that the dimension of the everyday has been brought into clearer focus, more precisely through the exploration of individual lives in the writings of Ewing (1997), Verkaik (2004) and Ring (2006). Moreover, these lives are equally that of state institutions and artifacts, of political parties and religious traditions, as of average Pakistanis. It is not necessarily the case that the sheer existence of a 'daily-ness' negates crisis, that is, in self-perpetuating everyday life gives lie to the crises that inform Pakistan's past and present. Nor is it the case that a more organic order holds within everyday life that gives cause for hope in the face of the artificiality of the state, the fragility of national connectivity and the pervasiveness of foreign influence. Rather, the same forces
exist within the dimension of the everyday as they do within the national scene, suggesting how crisis is lived. Attention to the detail of everyday life yields a differentiated milieu, a complex range of human subjectivities and activities and the continual possibility of an unexpected turn of events leading to different outcomes. In other words, it yields an existence that cannot be entirely contained within the category of crisis and its standard evaluations.

With Bard, Andrabi et al., Hull and Khan, I turn now to the four final essays for an elaboration of the everyday that, while not entirely resisting crisis, at least exceeds its evaluations. In 'Look Who's Talking Now: Voice and Authority in Pakistani Shi'i Women's Gatherings', Amy Bard continues Akbar Hyder's exploration of Shia theology but as lived experience through her focus on a young Shia zakira (female preacher) in Pakistan. The preacher's services are in great demand during the Islamic month of Muharram when Shias mourn their loss through commemorating the events of Karbala in various gatherings (majalis). Restricting herself to female-only majalis, Bard does a close study of the recitational form and narrative strategies of the preachers. In the process, the sectarian conflicts in Pakistan that are repeatedly mentioned in the essays by Rozehal, Ahmed, Abbas and Hyder fade out of sight. Instead, we are brought close to the theological events that inspire devotion and the disciplining in rhetoric and gesture by which one learns to render these events so as to make one's audience re-live them. The largely female audience must cry copiously for the preacher to consider her lecture a success.

Through the close analysis of a particular sermon, Bard suggests the virtuosity of the preacher as of the women-audience, leading her to argue that Shia women have not only kept vibrant their tradition through their enthusiastic participation, but they have actually innovated styles of performance and audience response. While Bard acknowledges the difficulties introduced into Shia lives by the larger context of Pakistan, even these are turned to the advantage of devotion as references to contemporary political events are used in sermons to elicit deeper emotional responses. In the end a minority is shown to endure in Pakistan.

While Bard speaks of the everydayness of a religious tradition, Tahir Andrabi et al. in 'Madrasa Metrics: The Statistics and Rhetoric of Religious Enrolment in Pakistan' focus on the education choices of Pakistani parents in rural settings to discount the inordinate
Introduction

The tradition of religious education and the deep desire to become acquainted with the natural order of things are used in the end of minority at the inordinate

Bard suggests that the natural order of things should be used in the end of minority. In the end of minority, Bard suggests that the natural order of things should be used in the end of minority. In the end of minority, Bard suggests that the natural order of things should be used in the end of minority. In the end of minority, Bard suggests that the natural order of things should be used in the end of minority.
like outright corruption may not be so easily categorised. Many of the actions are, after all, undertaken to redress gross neglect, in some cases injustice, of the state, others to ensure that families and communities stay together in the face of the dispersal mechanisms at work within the bureaucracy, while still others are undertaken out of relations of friendship and kinship. Thus, Hull refuses to see this as a crisis of the state or of civil society. Instead he prefers to see this as the way in which something as unwieldy as a modernist city, built from scratch, has been made to work; how a bureaucracy has come to be inhabited by non-bureaucrats; and, how an authoritarian government has been pushed and pulled into expressing a politics of sorts.

In the final essay in the series on the everyday, 'What is it to build a Mosque? Or, the Violence of the Ordinary', Naveeda Khan attempts to take stock of everyday life in urban Pakistan, in the city of Lahore, through a close examination of how people busy themselves with building mosques in their neighbourhoods. She explores mosques as she sees the building of mosques both as a time-old expression of piety as well as an expression of the Pakistani imagination of new beginnings within the context of the nation-state. It soon becomes clear through people's narratives that mosques are built with various projects of self-formation in mind and community. Khan explores these projects through the stories of construction and the politics of usurpation that develop around individual mosques. In this way, she is able to show how central and lively experimentations on the self and the community are in Pakistani Sunni practice.

However, it soon becomes clear that entropy is also part of this milieu. Entropy, in her case, results in the dispersal of the original momentum behind building mosques as people descend to fighting each other. While such entropy is to be expected, the essay draws on Henri Bergson (1998) to suggest that life requires the conservation of energy to take a milieu forward. There is a sense in which small acts of consideration towards others in the midst of conflicts shows this milieu to be banking energy for a different future.

In the discussion of the essays in this collection thus far, I hope to have shown how crisis, devolved into its various evaluations as failed state/artificiality of the state, failed nationalism/difficulties of committing to a single vision, compromised sovereignty and security/foreignness within, is lived and prevailed over at various times and different settings within Pakistan. This is by way of suggesting how crisis and its beyond constitute a simultaneous experience for
prised. Many of the neglect, in some milieus and commu-

munications at work undertaken out of respons-
ses to see this as a refers to see this as inist city, built from icy has come to be itarian government litics of sorts.
What is it to build eda Khan attempts the city of Lahore, y themselves with explores mosques me-old expression imagination of new e. It soon becomes e built with various ity. Khan explores and the politics of ines. In this way, she tations on the self e.
is also part of this nal of the original descend to fighting the essay draws on the conservation of in which small acts onlicts shows this on thus far, I hope ou evaluations as nalism/dificulties d sovereignty and ver at various times way of suggesting our experience for Pakistanis and how mulling this simultaneity provides the conditions of possibilities for attaching to Pakistan.

Other themes have emerged from my discussion so far that are also important to put on the table. As with the earlier generation of pakistani scholars, we see many of the authors in this collection pre-occupied with the event of partition and its capillary effects into the present. Colonialism is a persistent influence upon the present whose lineaments we have yet to take full measure of. There is a sense in which India exists not only as a regional enemy but also as an intimate other. The question of Bangladesh or how to come to terms with what happened in 1971, which goes beyond pious hand wringing and cringing confessions, is a crucial issue that Pakistan continues to deal with. While the state is often shown to be weak and compromised or violent and repressive, it is never complacent and inactive. Instead, it is shown to be continually attempting to gauge the demands upon it and to adjudicate on contentious issues. The fact that other forms of social arrangements, aesthetic productions and political imaginaries exist but are either hidden from view or excised from public memory posits the necessity for perpetually recounting the history of Pakistan but from varied perspectives and through diverse sources. That the history of Pakistan is not simply a local history but a part of world history with experiences in Pakistan speaking to larger historical and theoretical issues is a consistent claim of the writings presented here.

Finally, there is the issue of Islam's place in Pakistan. Throughout I militated against organising the essays that dealt with Islam under a common rubric. This reluctance on my part comes from my sense that Pakistan's relationship with Islam is all too often readily assumed, as in the Pakistani ruling elite instrumentalises Islam or that Pakistan turned to Islam with the failure of its nationalist project. Yet, if one looks at the essays in this collection, one can see how Pakistan's relationship with Islam is as problematic as its relationship with the state form, nationalism or foreign influence. In other words, mulling over the problems of Islam in Pakistan, in its myriad ties to colonial bureaucracy and governance, the perception of official Islam as artificial, the multiple imaginings of Islam, the fears over the outer aggression towards Islam and its inner pollution, the endurance of the tradition along both its majoritarian and minoritarian forms, all speak to how integrally Islam is tied to the problem of belongingness
and the means of attaching to Pakistan. Therefore, it alone cannot be considered as the panacea to Pakistan’s problems.

**Conclusion**

If a state were in perpetual crisis, or rather, goes from one articulation of crisis to another, how do the fortunes of its citizen body and ancillary institutions fare? Does the army, as a privileged institution, derive its strength in inverse proportion to that of the civilian state? Do political parties simply perform their differences from one another without offering meaningful options to the state and citizenry? Must the legislature, judiciary and bureaucracy now work under the taint of corruption and compromise? Do the citizenry, under the rubric of ordinary people, doggedly continue on as before while dealing with new exigencies as they arise? What happens to all that which makes up a nation-state but goes under the threshold of the sensible, such as, shared memories, traditions, and histories; affiliations to peoples and places; and, senses of a future together, however contested these may be? Much is assumed by way of cause and effect and little demonstrated in the instance of a postcolonial state such as Pakistan.

It is with these fighting words that we began this exercise some three years ago, to put together this volume of writings. Our effort was to introduce an empirical thickness to the history and present of Pakistan. While we were not able to answer all these questions we posed to ourselves, it is from this vantage position of detail that this collection works hard to interrogate the predominant narratives that locate Pakistan under the sign of crisis, by examining how crisis is framed, sensed, registered and refused in different ways by various constituencies. In so doing, we hope to have unsettled assumptions that intercalate state, civil society and citizenry in Pakistan and that go under the guise of common sense. Finally, it is our hope that these contributions will prompt not only a reconsideration of Pakistan, but will also serve as a meditation on the present condition, that of ‘human immigrancy’.

**Notes**

1. In this introduction I do not study any one instance of crisis in Pakistan. Rather, I am interested in the discursive evaluations of crisis that have developed over the course of Pakistan’s history. However, my approach is not deconstructing these discourses, to unmask some villainy at work internal
Introduction

2. While the outpourings of these disciplines on Pakistan are much too vast and varied for me to cover exhaustively, I do wish to draw attention to the fact that this writing is largely undertaken by scholars located in the United States (US), with the second largest bulk of writing by Pakistani scholars. This should not surprise given the extent of US involvement in the country. Notable among US scholars are Abbott (1968), Baxter (1974 and 1984), Binder (1961), Braibanti (1987), Bray (1997), Callard (1957), Cohen (1984 and 2006), Feldman (1972), Kennedy (1987), Oldenburg (1980 and 1985), Weiss (1986 and 2001), Wheeler (1970) and Ziring (1980). Among Pakistani scholars who show a preoccupation with crises of the state, nationalism and security see Khan (1973), Hussain (1985), Islam (1981) and Azam (1974). Others, those better known, will be introduced over the course of this introduction. Even a quick survey of this scholarship in both the US and Pakistan suggests the need for a sustained study of the influence of the US on educational institution building, scholarly networks, and genres of scholarship in Pakistan. See Saunders (2001).

3. See Gilmartin in this volume for a refutation of this position.

4. I try to the extent possible to use scholarly works produced by Pakistanis. Even though I limit my focus to English writings I would argue that the incorporation of non-English writings and even those by avowed non-securitarians would not greatly change my argument.

5. One of the reviewers of the book asked that I specify for whom in Pakistan belongingness is a problem. This is a provocative question; it resonates with the commonly held perception that the elite of Pakistan do not somehow belong to Pakistan as such either because of the cosmopolitanism they espouse or because of their privileged lifestyle which is at odds with that of the majority of Pakistanis. Yet, I would argue that this sense of not quite knowing how one fits into Pakistan plagues many, across class and ethnic divides. This is borne out by several of the papers whose subjects are not the elite at all but the lower middle class (Verkaaik) and the poor (Andrabi et al.).

6. Memon's 1983 article is quite an eye opener into how West Pakistani public intellectuals and presumably the larger public assimilated the events of 1971. Besides, the paucity of writing on 1971, which already suggests a cultivated ignorance and self-censorship on part of the public, the writings that do exist further suggest that by and large most blamed Bengali Hindus for inciting East Pakistan into rebellion, focused largely on the India-Pak aspect of the conflict, in particular the Pakistani prisoners of war subsequently held and released by India, and expressed the loss of East Pakistan in terms of nostalgia for a territory of great natural beauty that is oddly un-peopled. These perspectives are born out by the essay by Yasmin Saikia in this volume. Regardless of the apparent amnesia by the state and its subjects towards 1971, along with Itikhar Dadi in this volume I would wager that the loss of such a large part
of its territory and population could certainly not go unnoted. While Dadi shows how this loss manifests itself as a growing ambivalence towards the archetypical Urdu speaking national subject, an affect cinematically expressed, Kamran Ali in his essay shows how the aftermath of the war brought about a substantial shift in geopolitics and national policy leading to the undermining of a previously strong labor movement. In other words, 1971 exerted a capillary effect through all spheres of life in Pakistan. It is precisely this capillary effect that I note in post-1971 history writing and historiography in Pakistan, which seem to return obsessively to the problematic origins of Pakistan as if to attempt to anticipate and subsume the violence of 1971 within their accounts. The gesture I see is similar to the one Tahir Naqvi shows of the Pakistani state in its attempts to anticipate and subsume the violence of 1947 within itself.

7. For the purposes of this introduction I have taken Rounaq Jahan’s writing as that of a Pakistani as it was written immediately before the formation of Bangladesh. She is now off Bangladesh.

8. I am not at all suggesting that Pakistan shouldn’t do more in terms of 1971 but that 1971 is built into all post-1971 scholarship, even if only implicitly and inadequately, and that this mode of invocation is deserving of attention even if only as a way to understand how a people lives alongside a public secret. Such attention may also yield understanding of how a society, and not only a state, imposes silences and sacrifices upon its own. See Das (1995 and 2006).

9. Hamza Alavi is famous for having coined the term ‘salariat’ for those Muslims in the colonial bureaucracy who spearheaded the Pakistan Movement. See Alavi (1989).

10. Among Pakistani scholars, Lalal (1990) and Rizvi (2000) have made persuasive studies of how Pakistan inherited the bulwark of its defense economy from the colonial state among others. Western scholars, in particular historians such as Gilmartin (1988), Low (1991), Metcalf (2003), and Talbot (2005) have left a distinct mark on scholarship studying the colonial inheritance of Pakistan.

11. In Das’s essay in the same volume, she shows how each rule emerges with the conditions of possibilities of its infringement. States derive their power as much from the making of rules as from the zones of their transgression.

12. See Ahsan (1997) for an attempt to argue the prefiguring of Pakistan on grounds of civilisational difference rather than religious.