I want to add some supplementary remarks to what I said on Monday:

1. The first task is with the
   urge of the teachers
   term 'simultaneity of distant
   events', which we take as an
   example of T. application
   of T. theory in general. We may
   again use Einstein's simple
   illustrative of T. question:
   "T. simultaneity of
   whether lightning struck
   two distant places on a
   railroad track simultaneously?
   7. operational aspect of T. use of
   7. assert T. to lighten
   did strike from place"
Simultaneously, we say, when this: to say H. by old V. means a ray of light left F. 2 places a) without that lighting struck or not reached by observer at T. from M. midway between them, simultaneity.

7. comments which previously made in this may be put in other words, as follows: if this was not equivalent (a) H. determined M. is midway below A. B does indeed require an operator on somebody.

part namely that preceding.

F. distance above A M.

B or M. respectively, that is, is

2. only operator internal ordinary things of T. term H. his involved. the operator is not what is
declared to be what is meant, or
equal to what is meant, by the
question 7. The 2 lightning-
senses are at 7. distant places
are simultaneous. What is declared to be meant is 7.
light. may 7. those places be,
by or can be perceived simultaneously
at the same time from one cell.

i.e. Experiencing sense data
an operation of the likes.
but if so, 7. and operation is
quite an unusually broad
meaning.

So it covers 'obtaining'
in general. 7. point is of
major importance. It is
worth mentioning only
to show 7. 2. choice of
1. 2. formulas.
A happens at M is adapted to events A & B being present at B, where the operation does not take place. This assumption of the attribute simultaneously to F. 1 distant - and possibly unobserved - events appears to show M. M is not distant - M distant simultaneously, and being this I say to those who advance his art in empirical terms. They recognize the fruit from a criterion of the attribute with 2 events, but they implicitly distinguish between a criterion of M & A being at M, A & B at A & B.
But this very issue seemed to you a rather fine distinction, and I thought well now add my supplementary observation and remarks on it.

1. A.C. & F. operators, twice similar at a place simultaneously, at a distance are said to be definite by means of different operators, we must recognize that these are not one concept but 2.

F. are not F. same simultaneity.

Note: I simply raise it. Question

...whether it is impossible to conceive of the same temporal relations as substituting belw. 2 distant events as is conceived of in spatial...
we knew perfectly well what
we meant by saying it. Some
one, confused at 7. Same time 7.
T. lecturer was dictating. Then the
two. 'confused.' Usine anything
in the nature 7. Except.
Or occurring at 7. Same place.
It from being applicable
thought to the events
"pective of the places of their
occurrence. Next. There is
something in the nature of
Kugo. World 7. Prevents
of anything 7. T. Similarly
from being directly verified.
is true, namely, T. finite. only
effect of 7. T. I think. But it
does not follow from this.
I can't flinch 7. Lightly
at the King. T. T. from
the task in precisely.
Same sense as it think of
T. 2 rays of light among
simultaneously at M. Ether.
I cannot restore it not a question of physics, but a question of the analysis of my own concepts; and it is not always necessarily entertaining different places remote from one another. So far as I can see, the answer to this question is no. I cannot think of simultaneity in most cases, unless as applicable of the former and of the latter. And so far as I can judge, people generally cannot. And the circumstance arising from a peculiarity of light or sound, I cannot verify. I. Simultaneity

in T. I. cases in T. Schrödinger way had nothing to do with
to myself to mean, i.e. to be referring to T. a speech delivered by Pres. Roosevelt at the White House—or by any means wh. I may according to my politics, attend to that speech—whether I conceive it or speech to be heard over the radio or read in the newspaper. the means of acquire w.t. a thing are, more or less in that in general, distinct from the thing w.t. it made me acquainted, and it is the w.t. same event, quality or relation I may become acquainted with quite different means, and a diversity of. means is perfectly compatible w. identity of. concept—i.e., of. means I entertained.
But further:

I suggest that by an analysis of how best is implicit in the reasoning of T. Opere, that if I adopt simplicity, it can be seen that he has eliminated...
uniform velocity, unless it is assumed 114. that from A to B at the same time — in the ordinary sense — and that at attachment at what one ray was 5 yards from A, the other was five yards from B. But the operation of their meeting at M, while said to be the only necessary simultaneity in the case of distant events, has not yet occurred. How this meeting other was a part of the measure of uniform velocity, that there shall be identical time — magnitude for the two motions; and in these identities identical times, identical results; such as one can say at 7.30 a.m. when ray 1 at such a point, there is at such a point, relative to...
railroad-tracks, ray 2. At this moment, at speed such as at such an other point, relatively to the railroad track. First the operational account of the

at a distance, facility presumes a concept of simultaneity at a distance, which is not in accord with an operational, or which is precisely the same as the concept of simultaneity at a place.

So much for the additional observation at A. From the

Wf of simultaneity taken as a test case for the theory.
3.

Greek's 'I'm - 'The' for the

reason why. But I agree they

had wondered. In the end,

such a thing would care. I

understand this. By then,

the Greek's 'I'm - 'The' for

the reason why. It might be

true. I agree they had

wondered. In the end,

such a thing would care. I

understand this. By then,
employs, therefore, are, in final analysis, metrical concepts.

Terms: How a metrical quantification, and more specifically metrical, concepts of terms—of width, length is an analysis. Now it is of the nature of metrical terms that they are relational. They are and implicitly operational in their meanings. To say that a table is four feet wide is to say that at a standard foot-rule were laid down upon it, you would have to apply a foot-rule to its surface four times in order to reach from one face to the other. It is only by such rules that new fundamentally consistent
may pleasantly be said:

it is clear H.T. sentenced (1.

Table is 4 ft. wide) meant

anything more than this. Physical

measurement is t. encompassing

one physical object w. another

in respect of some determinate

type of magnitude (length

or weight; and this, in uttering a

metrical proposition) y. d. not

neigh mean H.T. operation of

measurement has actually been

performed, y. might that it

can be performed. One might,

indeed, still insist it. The

idea of the table's being four-

foot long is only t. idea of

of a situation beneath H.T. All

visible width of t. table; a fort-rile,

and that the idea of this relation

is not the identical w. T. idea of

every of the operation of

laying the rule down on t.

the table; and in strictness
This would I readily undertake. The relation is not the operation which exhibits or verifies it. The operation is still of the way of obtaining evidence of the fact that the relation the question puts into its between the two objects, or of some other character. But this is somewhat nice logical distinction which may not be evident to every one, and the physicist should perhaps not be expected to bother about it. For his purposes it is doubtless enough to define 4-f. loop as identical with meaning W. capable of being a foot-rule and drawn along a straight line from each edge 4 times, successfully without overlapping, the=}
To accept very little else may not need not be thinking of anything more than this when the usual former term.

But it is manifestly a very wide difference. Sec. the operational definition: w. a qualification: if accepted, it obviously does not follow that all concepts are similarly operational. But we assuredly have concepts of other things than relations and quantities—form, of qualities, actual concepts of a quality as such as 'blud,' 'sweet,' 'painful,' 'beautiful'—is not a concept of an operation-weilser once more, 'operation' includes in its denotation such psychological events as 'thinking' or...
simply receiving the order to get a world to which the operations in which physics is interested—namely, species of measurement—can be applied, he has to apply explicit qualities to substitute, e.g., for color, the purely qualitative differences between visible colors, quantitative differences, measured in Avogadro units, between hypothetical waves, lengths, and so on.

And it is here that one may observe one of the paradoxes that arise in the transfer of the operational theory from
Physics to psychology. Do we have sensational and concepts of maladies, and if not, are not operations of measurement, or operational, all-what can be sensed, felt, or thought of - then are operational psychology well seem to be one which begins by exclusion from its pursuit precisely one of the major features of human experience. There would be no harm in this. For certain purposes, omission, if it were admitted to be an omission, in that case the operational human psychology would simply
be an essentially a study of one
almost entirely limited to the
investigation of certain
quantitative parts of experience
which can be quantitatively
compared, and the comparison
verified by means of
measurements. Not
essentially different in
kind from those of physics.
But what we are frequently
indeed, usually offered
under the name of
'operational psychology'
is a professedly adequate
account of what occurs
in the life of human
individuals and specifically
a denial of the duality
and a denial of the occurrence of mental events or the existence of mental contents, in the sense of 'mental' already defined. - I will cite as an illustration of this a passage from an article by D.S. McGregor.
This interpretation of measurement has produced no valid distinction between psychological and physical magnitudes. It makes psychology and physics indistinguishable. So far as the nature of the magnitude is concerned, such a conclusion is right or wrong. Length is as psychological as it is physical. Hardness is as mental as pain. From its power of new we find it psychological measurement. Physical measurement are one and the same thing.

It is no doubt, however, if psychological and physical experimentation are directed toward different goals. The psychologist is interested in the voluntary operation of the human or animal organism. The physicist is interested to explain the nature of the phenomena in the realm of inorganic matter. He may, as far as inanimate objects are concerned, measure the same magnitude in different ways. Physical and psychological tests enable this to occur.
nature of F. relationships betw. F. organism and natural sciences (or psychicalist studies). It is only where F. organism is not yet well understood where F. psychologist can accept any form of measurement. It is this fact that may become unavailable in F. construction of a Theory of Vision. Thus psychology may totally enter F. domain of natural sciences, using physical magnitudes of physical operations to explain a set of phenomena peculiar to its own.

...is physical measurement. It always has been and the psychologist now...