The Argument of Methodological Behaviorism
The first requirement of the game in empirical, that is, observational or experimental, science is that its observations or experiments shall be "objectively repeatable," which here means, capable of being repeated by more than one investigator. If all investigators, working under the same conditions, who repeat, for example, a given experiment, under identical conditions, first get for themselves, then each time the use of their own resources, the same result, that result is put down among the verified factual conclusions of chemistry. This, indeed, is what
They lack a commonly sensible datum. Indeed, precisely what science means by a "fact," an
admitted experiment performed
under unique conditions
is, by hypothesis, unrepeatable.
Conditions would have never
be taken seriously by
men of science; and
a result found by one
investigator, which nobody
else could find, would not
pass for a fact. If a
physicist named Peter
Jones should send to a
scientific journal a report
that he had discovered
in his laboratory...
an interesting new phenomenon which he proposed to call "the Peter Jones effect," because it had the odd peculiarity of being such that no one except Peter Jones could observe it— it is certain that the editor of the journal would not trust Mr. Jones's paper.

All this is elementary; but it proved to have some startling consequences when applied to the science of psychology. For it presently began to dawn upon psychologists that if their science was destined to deal with inner subjective states of their subjects, states capable of being
directly known only through the
subjects' own introspection—
then psychology could
apparently not meet this
first and simplest
requirement
of scientific method—
in short, could not claim to be
a science at all. To make it
such, psychologists for
a subject's introspective
report of what he is thinking
or feeling in a given experimental
setup is a statement by
one person about something
which no other person
can actually observe
by himself. It is, in principle,
like the "Peter Jones effect."
What the subject says may
happen to be true but it
is not objectively verifiable
precisely because it

by hypothesis, a statement about a purely subjective phenomenon.

Thus, to convert psychology into a science, therefore, it seemed evidently necessary to cease to rely upon subjects' retrospective reports of their introspection, and to admit into the factual content of the science only those results of an experiment which the observer could in fact observe—which any
and all observers could observe for themselves.
And the only things which were real, thus objectively and publicly observable about the subject of an experiment are his bodily responses.
To the stimuli to which, in the experiment, he is subjected—in short, his bodily behavior.

His conclusion that what was once psychology—which once used to be defined as the science of mind or mental phenomena—must be converted into the science of behavior—naturally first forced itself upon these psychologists, who engaged largely in the experimental study of the responses of non-human animals. In this case, of course, you could not get even retrospective reports. We
Behavior and movement strongly influence what we can see. Animals do it, but, since they can't talk, we can't tell whether their visible behavior is or is not accompanied by sensations, including pain and pleasure, or ideas. It may be that when we react to the same event, it doesn't hurt them the way it hurts us, and that when we twist a cat's tail, it does not feel it, though it does scratch. What your dog is entirely
describe the feelings of friendliness or affection which you finally attribute to them. Even in this case, it is not clear for purposes of ethics it appears necessary to adopt some working hypothesis on the subject. If horses feel no pain, there is no reason under heaven for not letting them stare to death, when they cease to have an economic value to their owners. If dogs are unconscious automatons, there is no greater reason for not letting little Willy gouge out his dog's eye than for letting not letting little Mary gouge out her doll's eye. Since we cannot avoid performing acts
which shall deter the turkeys from entering the grounds. It will be decided upon what we will have our annual meeting. Most students were present to express their feelings about the new rules.
You can be observant about animals' behavior, and only their behavior, and what is called
the science of animal psychology.
Therefore, must be in the
perception of those behaviors.
If it is to claim scientific
reliability, it does not
appear that animals are not capable of
how, as I have mentioned before.
Methodological behaviorisms
arose in part
through an extension of the
same reasoning to human
subjects. It is true that
human subjects in a
psychological laboratory
can and do talk. But then
Falknap, so far as it is
observable, is just a particular
kind of bodily behavior—a
motion of the vocal
organs by which are
But, for the reasons already suggested, it soon became apparent that the same conclusion must be extended to human psychology. That there is no fundamental difference between the methods of animal and human psychology. It is true that, unlike the animals, human subjects in a laboratory cannot talk. But then talking, so far as it is observable, is just a particular kind of bodily behavior—motion of the vocal organs by which are
produced for various sound waves that they reach the ear of the observer, or motions of the mind, for example, in the case of deaf mute subjects; or, in true experiments, motions of reaching out to press the blade designated cutout. That these motions are either determined by or accompanied by sensations, ideas, mental concepts, reasonings, feelings, pain, or emotions — as these terms are understood by psychologists — or in common speech — something which the investigator cannot perceive. Based on this, an experiment, and
can have as an immediate datum of his experience. He therefore cannot testify to it as a fact of his own knowledge, and, as the lawyers like to say, "what the soldier said is not evidence." That the subject is not leaving the introspective but not externally observable sensations and feelings which the reporter, the observer is of can no more decase, no more entitled to deny than to affirm. The subject may mean something by his words, and he may be telling the truth, a methodological behaviour. Who knows what he is about? Will always
scarcely avoid denying the possibility of this. But he will deny that this possibility is of any interest to him as a man of science, since it is not for him, an empirically verifiable possibility.

It is scarcely necessary to add that this agreement of behaviorism drawn purely from the principles of scientific method was reinforced by the disappointing results of introspective experimental psychology of the 1880s and 1890s. The reports of subjects were found to be vague, conflicting.
as to what they were subjectively experiencing under given experimental conditions were often found to be of obscure meaning and, when the experiments were repeated, conflicting; and in any case, their value depended upon the dubious assumption that the words used by the subjects, in the attempt to describe presumably delicate and elective subjective states, had for the observer precisely the same meaning which they had for the subject. These considerations, however, do not serve to which we shall return — were not by themselves conclusive.
If, on other grounds, you have shown that no experiences any content of his experiences as his content, no reason for supposing that this is not similarly to that of other experiences, at least you can then say that there is no reason for supposing that this is not similarly to that of other experiences, but you cannot reverse the argument, and say assume in advance that the methods of pale method of typical may it must be the same as that of other experiences.
more than bodily behavior would be, at any rate, unscientific, we shall shortly see. At the moment I wish only to suggest that a purely methodological parochial behaviorism is not a tenable position for psychology as a special science, and is obviously inadmissible in such an \textit{acting as we are engaged in} if either is or is not the fact that the life of a human or animal includes events other than movements or make actually or theoretically by an outside observer, either is or is not the fact that what we call behavior mean when they speak of \textit{consciousness}, \textit{sense data}, \textit{images}, \textit{feelings}, are what.
actual phenomena. It is not true, furthermore, it either is or is not true that these phenomena, if they exist, modify the behavior of human organisms. If they do, these things should happen. To be true, it would necessarily be a part of the business of the psychologist to take account of them; and it is therefore a part of his business to ask whether they are true or not; for if he refuses to ask them and to try to answer this question, it is a business which for these purposes is important, and one that should not be disregarded or sidestepped. All of them would amount to a refusal to notice.
consider certain facts relevant to any comprehensive description of human nature or any comprehensive enumeration of the determinants or constituents of human behavior relevant, in other words, to the subject-matter of psychology. It is, no doubt, permissible for an individual psychologist to make a provisional delimitation of his personal field of inquiry by deliberately excluding from his consideration all but a certain class of phenomena from his investigation. This is a legal right, but it is not permissible for psychology as a science
simply to inquire any fact pertinent to the class of natural events which it studies. The first rule of scientific method, after all, is: try to determine if any fact which has any possible face of all the facts which have any possible face of relevance to the behavior of the species we are investigating. I am not at this point, please understand, asserting that there are any facts, any ingredients in the life of living creatures, and above those which the behavioristic psychologist recognizes, and only asserting that if there are, you can invoke the scientific method as a justification for declining to face the
and if it is argued, methodological caution would be necessary.
Some criticisms, e.g. R. H. Wheeler, has unjustifiably directed against all the (even most radical) behaviorists are fairly applied to R. A. W.'s methodological view. The fallacy of behaviorism is, as I understand it, its "incompleteness of method"... One of the unanswerable flaws of scientific procedures is of leaving uncontrolled, unknown conditions which affect or may affect the results. How to merely a methodological behaviorist "admits the guessed activities take place." I believe it professes to be uninterested in these, but he has no right to be unless he has gone at least determined whether they do or do not affect any reactions we are investigating.
The general methodological argument for behaviorism had, however, been potently reinforced, for many psychologists, by a more specific consideration. Previously alluded to.

already alluded to. In certain contexts in retrospective psychology it was assumed it everything depended upon a certain assumption, namely that the subject can only
means of words convey information to the phenomenal about sensory, affective, or other content which the observer cannot himself perceive. The subject experiencing but the question was presently raised: Can words — linguistic symbols — convey such information from one private experience to another — if, if they can do so to some extent, how far can they? And when this question was reflected upon, the answer...
Seemed to many to be that it cannot be known that language is in this sense a means of communication about subjective experience or that, at best, it is so only in the within narrow limits. This is most readily apparent in the case of words expressing qualities any kind of qualities. This is illustrated by what is sometimes called the bundle- or "paradox" which relates especially to color sensations.
That we can never be sure that words expressing qualities—any kind of qualities—have the same meaning for two persons, e.g., for a subject and an observer.

Suppose you throw a stone—what is itself difficult to be sure of—that you have two particles to which the organics in the presence of one and the same stimulus—e.g., a light beam. You ask them what the color of the object is. Both answer red; you change the stimulus, by moving, for e.g., what
...a piece of glass of a different chemical composition. Before the light, and again ask them what color they are seeing, but at this stage "green". Is this any evidence that the quality which is experiencing when he says "red" or "green" is qualitatively identical with what B is experiencing when he says "red" or "green". Obviously not, we assert, it is perfectly possible that the quality which A calls "red" is the one which B calls "green" or some quality different from either of the two others.
verbal, and other, responses to
the stimulus are constant; i.e.,

destroys the traffic signal which
be as well as to the called
"red" for A. The signal which
B called "green". It responded
to traffic signal by stopping his
car—and so on in all
other parallel cases—Then
that it would be absolutely
contradicted by any other
inference that the signal
which had not for A.
was not, for A, of the
color which B means by
"green." That they both
believe in the same way
—i.e., both stop their
cars at the same signal,
is an observable fact: that they are both having the same kind of color sensations is fast noticing, and, since it can be judged only from their words, and the we have no guarantee whatever that they habitually signify the same color-sensation by the same word. Here, the assumed fact that they are both being acted upon by the same stimulus does not prove that their sensations are the same, since the sensations are presumably the effects of conditions of the other-in-the-subjects as well as of the stimulus which is acting upon them. And what is one of
color-qualities, it is often further argued, must be true of all the qualitative features of experience, e.g., and of the words used to express them, for example, of feelings or emotions. You stick a pin into two persons, both have learned to say under such circumstances, that they feel pain. What is remarkable is that they both tend to react negatively to the stimulus; they flinch away, or extract the pin, or attack the pin-stick it with fire; but that quality of feeling that they take (as we suppose) to be define by using an...
identical word is an identical feeling you have, overcome, no means of ascertaining. And things which there is no means of ascertaining ought so the conclusion must to have no place in science, and therefore none in psychology. For this reason, as it then, it is argued, psychology must deal only with at least so far as the qualities of subjective experience (i.e., its statements) conflict its words in matters which do not have to be expected which do not depend upon the precarious and untestable assumption flat words at least
interesting and typical  

An example of the use of this argument by a distinguished behaviorist may be seen in an article of Professor E.C. Tolman entitled "A Behaviourist..."
The way in which the demand for empirical verification in the psychology of introspection may be illustrated by the experiment of Professor E. C. Tolman in his "Behavior of the Animal"

"We asked him to tell us whether he was angry or was afraid. But how do we know what he was angry or afraid 'mean'? He is not mythical creature who has emotional states as such. These particular words mean only in terms of the observer's experience, and the observer can experience only the behavior of his subject."
The child cannot get outside what is directly experienced in anger. The one thing they can ultimately identify the word for being angry is committing, must be something about the behavior or situation that produces it, or both. Does this interpret, intend to say that no child - i.e., no one ever means anything by "father is angry" than what he means by "father is fighting" or is talking in a loud, earth voice?"

"Or again, does the child exhibit anger in this behavior? Is the child angry? Again, perhaps one must get the meaning from something about the behavior and situation from not only but perhaps you will say it. Since in its case the word does not directly experience this own contains emotion. The meaning of the word will get directly attached to him to a concept, state such. Very good. But, tell again, he is angry no more gets directly into you [i.e., into his own] than did your concept state when you were angry, get directly into him, it was only because he was behaving in such
The error in the procedure is that the reference price is not used to determine the impact of the behaviour. Ultimately, the reference price only affects the decision between the two houses. However, the information is crucial for making the decision.

If we want to recommend a strategy for choosing the better house, we need more information. Perhaps, we need to consider the overall condition of the house and the location. Would you be interested in discussing further?

Your knowledge of this area is very important. It would be helpful if you could provide additional details about the houses, such as their size, location, and current market conditions.
"private contents" of any other person's mind.

Now this passage is interesting for all and quite bee of its authors' hesitancies and reservations; for it thereby illustrates precisely the passage-over of method into semantical behavior. Mr. Tolman does not get at first seem not to deny that he is exists, e.g., in the child to talk about "private contents" accessible only from introspection. But he points out that it cannot be identified — i.e., to conclude, i.e., what cannot be empirically known to the observer — because it cannot be directly into.

D. Observer in other way, for. Observer to verify anything means to get "his" directly into "his" experienti, true. Observer cannot do. Subjects introspection a subject report of his introspection is not knowledge — for. Observer is not all for Tolman, i.e., i.e., observer cannot, i.e., sense, know.
Behavior, verifiable, meaning. Tolman, as a subject, private context. Tolman almost, but not quite, goes on to conclude that the observer cannot mean anything by the subject's anger, except through certain behavior, which is a external, observable perception. The behavior defines what F. observes' meaning, at any rate, his "uses" of the term. What is F. observing significant here? Meaning, "uses" of F. observer can mean something more than anything kicking, when he says, "that body is angry" why? in earth sense to be unable to use "angry" to expect that meaning? Virtually, then, we have to ask any program, etc., an observer, O, or N, to identify "o" to know "0", "e", etc. cleaning it as his own, expertise? Words can expect only if there is treatment. Tolman, "The subject's behavior is in 67/97."
Known or knowable to $O$, but not his "private content."

E.g., words can express meaning for $O$, only $T$ subjects believed to never lie private content.

In retrospect, problem, if or not far, as it implies that the subjects words do constitute statements meaningful for $O$, observer at.

Yet subjects "private content" is consequently rests upon a false assumption.

Meanwhile, one can hardly gain from noting Mr. Blumen (or like first behawists) is himself himself.

Heavenly meaning universe what refer clearly reflecting in the baby's anger, his "knocks, emotional state as something else distinguishable in his. Blumen's argument is, the lies reader from the behavior analogue, i.e., to fully expression of emotion, to described difficulties in $T$ behavior is kept behavior.
Another important aspect of methodological behaviorism is well brought out by the passage cited from Tolman: its tendency to lapse into a kind of subjectivism in consequence of the very rigor of its demand for "objective" verification. Its reasoning, as we have seen, started from the principle that experimental science can admit as facts only phenomena which nearly observers can sensibly perceive for themselves, under the specified conditions under which a given experiment is carried on.
Their flag and many references

Chapelet of healing...
"objective" psychologist — in a
fact, the only scientific facts.
Therefore, are your true experiences,
the recognition of these,
that there are other observers,
who have the same
experiences, circumstances,
the same sensible experiences,
that you do — which is
what the argument began
by assuming — is no longer
admissible. Thus the
end and glory of the argument
contradicts its beginning,
and the definition of "objective"
and public fact
turns out to contain within
itself the implication that
these are only subjective
and private facts. This
is an outcome which
would doubtless have
gratified Hegel; for it is
is a striking example of a category
turning into its very opposite.
But it is not, I think, an outcome
of which most of the followers
of behaviorists are clearly and
steadily aware. They usually
if not entirely recognize that
his trustworthy continue to
use the notion of objective
verifiability in the sense
which it had at the
outset, and not in the
opposite sense to which
it resolves itself in the
end; they continue, in other
words, to take it as
presupposing a multiplicity
of observers, and consider
them the results of their
experiments as scientific
truths because they are assumed
to be attested by the experimenters
or capable of being attested, by a consensus of all investigators — disregarding the awkward circumstance that they are at the same time also implying that in a behaviourist world there could be only one investigator — if indeed there could in consistency be admitted to be so many as one, an interesting question which we shall later examine. The present paradoxical consequence of behaviourism, meanwhile, methodological behaviourists find it easier to think you will notice if you read their writings extensively and closely. They find it easier to disregard the subjective implication of their
reasoning just because, or in so far as, they are merely methodical. Since they do not, after all, deny that there are physical events — in fact, sensations, etc., like their own associated with the bodily processes of the subjects they observe, they tend, on account of the state of their theory, to dwell more fully on the assumption of such physical events. We have seen even Professor Holman doing this. A methodological bad faith in fact, all too often, is more evident in their case and that of the other observers, and none the less, keep these other observers outside.
Themselves, as independent contents of their own experimental feelings, which thereby — and thereby alone — acquire that desired attribute of objectivity. When, however, we pass on to Senders's fictional telebeirism, we shall find the subjectivistic implication of the doctrine frankly and even emphatically recognized, and at least the attempt made to adhere to it and work it out consistently. When we get the full-blown sazador before us, we shall have to consider more directly the question of what is to be done about it in present.
Before passing on to Semasiological theories, however, we may note that some Bellasists who do not themselves go so far as that have been led, at least in part to their conclusion by a consideration which may be called pragmatic (in the sense of an empirical term). Our practical interests, it is observed, are directed to control of the future and the knowledge which is pertinent to them is predictive knowledge. Now when
Two things are universally concurrent, you do it for purposes of pollution and control, need to know about it or to deal with, both of them.

It is enough if you can discriminate and act upon me. Even if... Then, it should happen to be true that when you apply a stimulus to a subject, effects always follow — a specific experience of some kind of content, say a bodily reaction — it is not pragmatically important to inquire about the private content —
Unfortunately, the text on this page is not legible. It seems to be a handwritten note or a series of thoughts, but the content is not clear due to the handwriting style and quality of the image. Without clearer handwriting or a transcription, it's challenging to provide a meaningful interpretation or translation.
Shui Fern compiled a list of future projects.

First, there's the project to build a new office for the science department. This will involve working with various committees to ensure all requirements are met.

Second, there's the project to develop a new curriculum that would incorporate the latest technologies.

Third, there's the project to upgrade the existing facilities, including the lab and library.

Fourth, there's the project to expand the research facilities, which would require additional funding.

Finally, there's the project to improve the campus facilities, including the cafeteria and gym.

These projects are in line with the university's strategic plan. They are expected to be completed by the end of the fiscal year.
This is a handwritten note. The text is difficult to read due to the handwriting style. It appears to be a series of thoughts or ideas. Without clearer legibility, it's challenging to extract specific content accurately. The note contains phrases like: "put it together" and "let me think about it later." However, the overall context is unclear due to the nature of the handwriting.
While Watson’s writings afford many
reforms advocated here it is
Scientific use of evidence for
Centeness, it will be difficult to
find an unambiguous declarati
No. 125 or 125 thing.